TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES AT THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE AND THEIR IMPACT UPON WORKERS

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Executive Summary

The Government Printing Office (GPO) is widely recognized recognized for being this country's largest printer and publisher. Its 127 year history is notable not only for the quality and quantity of what is produces but also for its ability to continually adapt to an ever changing environment. The current technological revolution confronting GPO poses yet another challenge to its management and workers. The primary mechanism through which this, the largest legislative branch agency, adapts to change has been collective negotiations. Collective negotiations occurs between management and the twenty bargaining units which represent approximately 80% of GPO employees.

Insistence by the Congressional Joint Committee on Printing that this mechanism be fully utilized in confronting the present challenge will greatly facilitate and enhance whatever the adaptation. Early involvement of these unions in the planning and decision making will lead to more constructive negotiations as to their eventual impact. Through the process of representative democracy, changes requiring accommodation become ratified by those most affected. Uncertainty and apprehension are replaced by participation and codetermination.

If the down sizing of GPO becomes the agreed upon adaptation, several options other than layoffs appear to be readily available. These are the options most utilized by the private sector in adapting to technological change. Retraining, attrition, equitable transfers, buyouts and early retirement constitute a portfolio of options. Reliance upon these options will do justice not only to GPO's history but also to those who labor to fulfill its mission.

Introduction

To understand the capacity and process of technological, operational and organizational change within GPO, it is necessary to acquire an appreciation of how this has historically transpired. The central mechanism responsible for GPO's adaptation to change has been democratic decision making achieved through the process of collective bargaining. Often misunderstood as an impediment, negotiations and ratification produce voluntary compliance which in turn enhance accommodation and foster mutual gains.

GPO printers were unionized prior to its inception and have played a central role in its continuing capacity to change. Early innovations which mechanized hand composition and presses were achieved by appointing Public Printers with strong union backgrounds. The Kiess Act (1924) legally sanctioned shared decision making prior to the passage of either the Railway Labor Act (1928) or the Wagner Act (1935). Labor and management have continued to reach accords which have enabled the GPO to provide the expanding services required of it by the ever increasing demand for government printing.

In recent years, the workforce has declined by more than 40%, as much as 80% of the printing has been contracted out, and important technological conversions have been achieved. Throughout this period, labor has come to agreements which

have preserved and even strengthened GPO's capacity to insure that the work will be done. The accusation that the high cost of printing internally at GPO is attributable to excessive wages has been found by two successive fact finders as having little merit. High costs are associated with the overhead required of GPO as a governmental agency, scheduling problems, the physical facility and the need for successful applications of technological improvements.

Today, GPO is confronted by yet another challenge to its capacity to adjust to technological innovations. With the advent of electronic printing, GPO will once again undergo a substantial transformation. Central to this adaptation will be the impact it portends for the workforce. Early involvement of the twenty GPO bargaining unit representatives in the planning and decision making process will enhance the negotiations over the impacts of the change. The Joint Committee on Printing should articulate an expectation that labor and management will confront this challenge as partners.

Whatever the specific future course is chosen, GPO has shown that it has a considerable capacity to accommodate the change with a minimal adverse impact upon the involved workers. The conversion from hot metal to cold typesetting, the accommodation of two EEO settlements, and the retraining programs leading to printing specialists positions demonstrate that major transformations continue to occur.

Although the pace and breadth of the change may quicken, GPO has demonstrated the capacity to negotiate outcomes which are acceptable to its workforce.

Similar changes which have occurred in major newspapers have been achieved with relatively few layoffs. The more preferred responses have been attrition, retraining and buyouts. Each of these is a viable option. The workforce at GPO is relatively old (45.2 years) and in some production units it is considerably higher. More than two hundred individuals are retiring each year and close to seven hundred are currently eligible. Retraining has been successful and transfers could be achieved through negotiated guarantees drawing upon the revolving fund. Buyouts or inducements for early retirements have been studied and appear to be another option.

The general conclusion reached in this study is that because of the strong tradition of collective bargaining at GPO, a mechanism for accommodation to change is presently in place. Management and labor must commit to a good faith effort to use this system. Labor should be involved in every step throughout the transformation and irreconcilable disputes, if they should arise, can be resolved through third party intervention. Management must recognize the mutual benefits which are to be derived from forming a full partnership with labor to co-determine GPO's future.

The Early Period (1850-1924)

From its inception on March 4, 1861 during Lincoln's presidency and continuing to this day, the GPO has continuously undergone technological change. These changes have had and will continue to have a significant impact upon the type of work and the workers at this, the largest legislative branch agency. This is sometimes under appreciated because GPO has been located for the last 86 years in the same massive eight story brick structure at H and North Capital Streets.

This building was constructed in part to house the new mechanical typesetting machinery which was revolutionizing the larger newspaper plants. By the time GPO, which was already proclaimed to be the "World's Greatest Printing Office," introduced forty-six Linotype and twenty-eight Monotype machines, 10,000 had previously been established in the private sector. There were more than 200 typesetting machines in place by 1908, thus further accelerating the conversion of hand composition to the mechanical process. Accompanying this conversion in the pre-press area was the acquisition of 34 new presses, eight automatic press feeders and four folders for the bindry. (1)

Changes in the accounting system and in spelling simplification further contributed to the massive

reorganization of GPO coinciding with the rapid acceleration in the demand for government printing.

According to newspaper accounts, these changes contributed to high levels of anxiety, dissatisfaction and irritation among the employees. The GPO was characterized as being demoralized in discipline, organization, and productive capacity. (2) These problems in turn contributed to a crises which occurred on June 30, 1906 in which Congress in its usual last minute scramble to conclude its session and flee a sweltering Washington, was delayed more than eight hours because of a massive printing backlog. (3)

Public Printer Stillings who had compounded problems by banning mirrors in the ladies rest rooms in a fool hearted attempt to control their vanity, was replaced. The new Public Printer, Mr. John Sleech, was a former compositor, proofreader, and foreman at GPO. As an insider, who remained an honorary member of the Columbia Typographical Union, the largest GPO union and oldest continuous local union in the country, he was ideally suited to facilitate the technological conversion and reorganization of work and its impact upon workers. (4) Although he served only four months until becoming ill, he is credited with enabling the transition to be successfully accomplished through job retention by retraining. This was the common practice employed in large private sector newspapers.

He was succeeded for the next five years by Samuel B. Donnelly, a former president of the International Typographical Union and the first Public Printer to be sworn in at the White House. Under his leadership the conversion became complete, productivity gains led both to reduced printing charges and a higher level of wages for GPO workers. His administration was also marked by the initiation of a retirement system that predated by nine years the original Federal Retirement Act and enabled 250 workers over age 65 to afford to leave their employment.

Changes in the printing processes continued to have a strong impact upon the GPO up to and throughout WWI. During this period, the offset process, photo-engraving and faster letter presses were introduced. These changes enabled the increased demand for government printing to be achieved through productivity gains while simultaneously lowering charges. Although safety improvements and worker welfare programs were established, wages which were fixed by law, fell behind those paid by other non-government employers. This resulted in GPO facing a continuous chronic shortage of skilled workers.

The Kiess Act (1924) and its Effect Upon Unionization and Bargaining

It is popularly assumed that the passage of the Kiess Act ushered in the era of unionization at GPO. Union printers,

however, were at H Street and North Capital before GPO was created in 1861. The workforce at the Wendell plant in Swampoodle which became GPO was already organized and GPO continued to rely upon hiring halls for its skilled workers. GPO experienced its first strike in 1862 when female press feeders walked out in attempting to gain a raise from the existing $5 to $6 per week. They won the increase, but bookbinders striking in the same year lost their demand to be paid more than their commercial counterparts because GPO did not employ them during the periods when Congress was not in session. (5)

The Act of 1867 gave the Congressional Printer authority to fix wages without consulting with the Comptroller of the United States. This power was rescinded in 1877 when Congress in an austerity mood became dissatisfied with GPO journeyman rates which it believed to be higher than comparable journeyman rates in private industry. (6)

The Kiess Act (1924) reestablished the power of wage setting to the Public Printer. The Act is limited to the rates of pay and permits differential compensation for night and overtime work. The wage rate was to be derived from a "conference" between the Public Printer and committees representing the various crafts of more than 10 workers. If a conference failed to yield an agreement, either party is granted the right of appeal to the Joint Committee on

Printing which then makes the final decision that is binding for at least one year.

There is little doubt that the Act which predates the Railway Labor Act and the Wagner Act and was unique for Federal workers, has worked remarkably well. Higher wages established under it made it possible to once again attract and retain competent printers. The Act also established for the first time an overtime rate of time and one half and a 15% bonus for night work. (7) Throughout the sixty years of its existence, there have been cycles of discontent by both sides. However, the process of wage negotiation and dispute resolution has worked extremely well. Given this success it is surprising that the Act has not been more broadly applied to cover white collar GPO workers or other federal employees. While in its day it was a significant innovation, it is by contemporary public sector standards quite constricted.

Executive Orders 10988, 11491 and the Civil Service Reform Act (1978)

President John Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988 in January 1962. This order set forth policies governing the respective rights and obligations of federal employees, employee organizations and agency management in the area of labor management relations. President Richard Nixon issued Executive Order 11491 which superseded 10988. It extended

the scope of negotiations and clarified it by providing for negotiation of appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the impact of realignment of work forces or technological change.

President Carter signed the Civil Service Reform Act into law on October 13, 1978. While the Act extended legislative sanction to collective bargaining, it was a far more narrow act than its private sector counterpart or many other public sector statutes for that matter. Management rights over wages and fringe benefits, hiring, work assignments, disciplinary actions, contracting out, firing, and position classification were largely left intact. The narrow scope of bargaining, no strike provision and weak union security provisions preserved management's prerogatives and supposedly protected the public interest. It did, however, extend collective bargaining to white collar GPO employees and granted more than wage bargaining to craft workers. The Act created an environment in which management of GPO has retained great latitude to organize the work of the agency but it did so within the context of assuring employment. This has allowed GPO to reduce its workforce by more than 40% during the last ten years to move from hot to cold typesetting and to retrain vast numbers of workers to the new requirements of the changing technology. GPO has done this without having to RIF a single employee and it has done this without the costs incurred at other agencies which have

lost experienced workers and suffer from low morale, poor organization and reduced productivity.

A discussion of the recent history of bargaining under these two acts is presented in a subsequent section. First, we must consider two important Equal Employment cases which were resolved during the last decade and which had a large impact upon GPO's training and advancement.

Equal Employment Opportunity Cases

During the recent decade of rapid changes in GPO which was mentioned in the previous section and which will be given greater expression in subsequent sections, two significant Equal Employment Opportunity suits were decided and implemented. They will be discussed because of their significant impact upon the GPO operations and workforce and because they provide an illustration of GPOs ability to effectively manage change when it is necessary or required.

On March 24, 1972, Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 became applicable to the federal government. On May 25, 1973, twenty-eight GPO women bindry workers instituted an administrative complaint on behalf of approximately 382 former and current journeyman bindry workers (JBW). This suit became known as the Thompson case. Bookbinders, a craft occupation, were historically entirely composed of men, while JBW's were entirely composed of

women. This long-standing sex determined classification system led to persuasive discrimination at GPO and in the printing industry generally. Women were unable to move into craft or supervisory positions because of this discriminatory practice.

The suit eventually required ten years to resolve and on April 20, 1982 the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit issued a decision affirming a District Court finding that GPO was unable or unwilling to recognize the persuasive pattern of discrimination. The Appeals Court further affirmed the District Court's relief order which required extensive back and front pay and a wide range of injunctive relief under the Equal Pay Act of 1974. This resulted in the recovery for approximately 37 JBW's of $3,827,000 in back pay and liquidated damages and Title VII payments to all class members of approximately $5,030,516. Front pay to incumbent JBW's was to be made as long as they remained employed and/or were not promoted. Calculated quarterly, this was estimated to reach $500,000 per year.

While the separate classifications were allowed to remain intact, GPO was required to open its hiring and promotion practices to JBWs and to implement affirmative programs to assure remediation and equal opportunity.

A second case, known as the McKenzie case, was brought to the courts under the same statute as was used in the

Thompson Case. McKenzie, a black ex- WWII pilot, had worked as a craftsman in the Offset Press Section (OPS) for thirty years. He charged that this department engaged in discrimination in regards to promotion to uprate (premium pay) and supervisory positions. A second suit initiated by other black workers in the OPS alleged discrimination in the training and promotional opportunities made available to non-skilled black printing press workers and offset press assistants. GPO , as in the Thompson case, rejected the complaint and the subsequent suit was finally decided by the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit on July 27, 1982. The allegation that GPO engaged in persuasive failures to hire, train, and promote black employees at all levels within OPS was sustained by the Appeals Court which upheld the district court award of both back pay and injunctive relief.

Both the Thompson case and the McKenzie case required that the GPO, in addition to paying substantial damages, institute an affirmative program. This program provided training to upgrade individuals impacted by past discriminatory practices. The training was provided at the same time GPO was providing retraining to those workers affected by technological change. This massive amount of training and retraining, while still ongoing, has been largely successful and will be discussed in the subsequent section pertaining to the future.

Today, GPO appears to have profited from the experience. As Tables I&II will attest, minorities are found at all levels within GPO and this represents a significant improvement over the not too distant past in which blacks were relegated to a separate cafeteria, forced to used separate bathrooms, and were only allowed in the bowling alley as pin boys. Lower level and mid level positions find significant representation of women and ethnic minorities. In the higher grades (GS 14 and above) the degree of integration is substantially reduced. Eighty percent of the one hundred eighty four upper level positions are currently occupied by white males. It would appear that this area represents the last challenge to GPO's willingness and ability to practice what it was forced to accept at the lower levels. If GPO was able to reform and open opportunities as successfully as it appears, it will be verified by the voluntary progression of women and ethnic minorities into greater representation in the upper level leadership positions.

Productivity and Cost

It should not be surprising that the issues of GPO responsiveness to executive branch agencies or the high cost associated with centralized government printing would be raised during the recent conservative era. Deregulation, privatization, inefficiency and waste have been part of the continuing debate about GPO since its first existence. Comparisons of GPO's costs and operations with non-GPO

alternatives have often suggested that improvements in the responsiveness and efficiencies might be achieved by replacing all or part of its functions.

The several scenarios considered in this OTA study broaden the debate but still miss the fundamental reality. GPO has survived one hundred and twenty five years to become the largest printer in the world and the disseminator of over 20,000 different government publications annually because it is unique. It is unique, not so much as an unregulated monopoly as its severest critics have charged, but as a government entity legally responsible to one branch of government (Congress) with an appointed head by another branch (executive). Unique too in that it incurs tremendous overhead costs which are necessitated by being a federal governmental agency. As a federal government agency it must pass along its mandated overhead which includes a general counsel, inspector general, administrative law judge and a 79 person police force.

GPO has survived because it has learned how to adapt to its environment. This adaptation has meant satisfying its many external masters while simultaneously achieving occasional accords with and compliance from those who must do the work.

In the early years of our nation the vast majority of all printing was produced for Congress. Printing was procured in a completely haphazard manner leading to delays and poor

workmanship. The Printing Act of 1819 attempted to address these problems by establishing performance criteria and set the rates that it would pay for printing. Unfortunately, this led instead to decades of private profiteering as technological advances produced enormous cost savings. This, in turn, led to corruption as the private printers sought to retain this lucrative business. This system was replaced by a contract system in which competition on the front end was fierce but cost overruns were often met with Congressional bail outs enhanced by further corruption. Out of this experience grew the Joint Committee on Printing in 1852, whose purpose,

> "was to establish guidelines for printers, and hired a Superintendent of Public Printing who was supposed to guard against opportunistic printers. These two groups, though, were unable to arrest a system based on political patronage and unscrupulous business tactics." (8)

GPO was created in 1860 to replace these failed systems. As Shawn Kelly describes,

> "At first, the Executive Branch voluntarily used GPO's services during the lengthy recesses of Congress; the Printing Act of 1895 made the use of GPO by the Executive and Judicial branches mandatory, and in 1895 that relationship made sense, as the Executive department's needs were still well within GPO's capacity of idle press time. But that balance between Congressional and Executive workloads is very different today." (9)

Today less than 15% of the total GPO budget is paid by the legislative branch. Despite this evolution, Congress still controls the GPO and it is Congress who GPO first and foremost contends itself with satisfying. Over time, this has resulted in preferential treatment of Congress. The tremendous growth in printing produced for the Executive

branch which occurred after WWII and continues to this day, has been increasingly satisfied by contracting out. What is produced internally is chosen largely on the basis of fill-ins for the periods of low Congressional demand.

Coopers and Lybrand's review in 1978 of GPO's operations provides an excellent review of the problems associated with scheduling the internal production workload. (10) This review is included in the following section.

In addition to the problem of scheduling, questions continue to be raised about labor costs and work rules, which result from negotiated settlements with GPO's twenty collective bargaining representatives. Generally, this thesis holds that GPO production workers are overpaid compared to non-GPO government printers or to their counterparts in the private sector. Supporting this thesis, Danford Sawyer, Public Printer 1981-198_ was led to remark in his attempts at privatization, the

> "GPO's in-house printing costs are already twice the average low bid from private sector printers and if past practices again prevail, the situation can only get worse." (11)

His attack upon GPO workers which took the form of a hiring freeze, slashed overtime, proposed furloughs and public criticism were given wide circulation during the early days of the Reagan administration. This attack was well coordinated with private industry printers including Mr. Arthur R. Stowe, executive director of Printing Industries

of Maryland, who wrote Mr. Sawyer and included in his remarks the following comparison,"

	GPO	WASH.D.C.	BALTIMORE
	40hr/wk	35hr/wk	37.5 hr/wk
Compositors	14.35	11.91	9.52
Book binders	14.11	13.17	9.25
Offset strippers	14.84	12.70	10.10
Offset pressman	14.84	12.60	10.05"

> "Anyone looking at these labor rates can readily understand why we in the private sector believe we can produce government's printing needs on a more cost efficient basis than GPO and save the taxpayers money. Why should we have to compete with our government for jobs that rightfully belong to the private sector?"
>
> "To quote from the last three paragraphs of my letter to Senator Mathias, (R.Md) "We would encourage you and the entire Joint Committee on Printing to support Mr. Sawyers efforts to reduce the amount of in-house printing done by the GPO and also to reduce the number of employees at the GPO." (12)

This attack was given further support by a GAO study requested by Rep. Newt Gingrich (R. Ga) who desired an "evaluation and analysis of GPO pay practice and classification systems in the relationship to the work performed by employees in the GPO production and production support departments." (13) This study, reported to Congress on June 3, 1983 that GPO's pay setting system for employees in collective bargaining units is not subject to the pay principles that apply to the government's administratively set pay system-- General Schedule and Federal Wage System

(FWS) and does not require that rates be comparable with those in the private sector as is required of other federal workers such as TVA and the Postal Service who bargain over wages. As a result, GAO concluded, (see Table III) this study recommended that Congress alter the pay and classification system at GPO by requiring that negotiated wage rates be determined on the basis of private sector prevailing wage surveys and that the craft workers be placed under the FWS and General Schedule classification and pay system.

Needless to say the Joint Council of GPO unions which bargains with GPO under the Kiess Act took strong exception to these findings and recommendations. Methodological concerns with the study were strongly expressed and the Joint Council joined with the chairman of the Joint Committee on Printing in questioning why the GAO had ignored the 1982 Fact Finders report which concluded that GPO was not remotely comparable to any other federal printing facility. (15)

In the 1982 report, which resulted from a bargaining impasse and which was the result of seven days of hearings, 2,140 transcript pages and over 150 exhibits, the fact finder strongly rejected GPO's contention that its craft workers should be subject to sharply reduced wages in order to bring them into conformity with federal wage scale for jobs bearing similar titles at other agencies. This report will

be discussed further in the following section dealing with collective bargaining. It is sufficient here to note that the fact-finder failed to buy the GPO's position.

Although the argument over productivity and costs will surely continue, little support was found for the attempt to single out the wage rates of workers. While it is true that during the current presidential administration, FWS employees have received very low pay raises and GPO craft workers have negotiated comparatively higher increases, many other issues would seem to be objects of concern. Included in this list surely should be,

1) Extremely large and very well paid supervisory, management and administrative components who have engineered pay grade inflation to compensate for lower pay raises. Many of these employees deeply resent the Kiess Act wage settlements of "blue collar" workers.

2) The expansion of the number of these positions, all of which contribute to overhead, at a time when the production workforce has been undergoing significant reductions.

3) Outdated physical facility which necessitates production on multiple floors an prevents vertical space sufficient to permit new technology without significant redesign and reduced efficiency.

4) Inadequately automated technology which led one private industry expert to remark that GPO more resembles a printing museum than a modern state of the art facility with which it is often forced to compete.

5) Poorly selected new technology which in some cases must be wrapped around unmovable columns or which has never been brought on line because of design flaws or inability to simply "make it work."

These and many other issues would certainly constitute rival hypotheses in any objective study of productivity and costs

but given the current American preoccupation with associating our production problems with workers, it is little wonder that this issue has been thoroughly analyzed and debated. It is ironic that while negotiations were stalemated over managements desire to cut wages by 22%, they were seeking in other forums, a quality of worklife program which they argued would lead to cooperation, shared decision making and productivity gains.

This discussion is not meant to put to rest this great debate. Surely it will continue into the foreseeable future. Uniqueness should invite comparison. But by isolating upon a single variable, such as a wage rate, no matter how alluring the association, does not inevitably lead to causation. It is undeniable and as it has been argued here, inevitable that internal GPO printing costs are more expensive than private sector competitors. The private sector, both the unionized and unorganized segments, maintain advantages. Compared with GPO their relatively small size provides greater flexibility and ability to specialize. It has also been argued that many of the more than 2,000 firms, which are annually awarded one or more bids, are doing this work at or near cost in order to fill idle production periods.

However, Shawn Kelly of the Public Interest Research Group has argued that many of the firms doing GPO work have became specialized. He concludes that 30 firms get over 44

percent of the value of all the work that is farmed out. Braceland Brothers, a Philadelphia firm, which is nonunion but pays higher than union wages, did over $13 million in government jobs in 1978. Much of this work was done as small jobs for agencies making repeat orders of forms. GPO could reclaim this work but as Kelly explains, the Federal Printing Procurement Program was designed to spread work throughout the country and to stimulate the private sector. Specialized presses would need to be purchased and agencies would have to burden a share of GPO's overhead and so it is not done. The issue is not the comparative wage rates because Braceland is a high wage printer.

Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining

The labor relations and collective bargaining process at GPO has had a long and mutually beneficial history for both management and unions. Today, 4,065 workers of a total workforce of 5,122 are represented by local unions. The last decade has witnessed enormous changes in the number of workers, technology and management philosophy. These changes have had a strong impact upon workers at GPO and upon the organizations which represent them. Standing back from the adversarial relationship which characterizes the day to day interaction between labor and management, one is forced to conclude that despite each sides rhetoric, the process has produced mutual gains through accommodations and formalized dispute resolutions. Because of these legal

mechanisms and genuine good faith on both sides, nasty strikes such as occurred in the Postal Service or with PATCO and employee alienation and malaise which has occurred through the federal sector have been avoided. Collective bargaining at GPO, despite its complexity and occasional acrimony, appears to be a productive mechanism through which to successfully accomplish adaptation to changing technology, operations and mission.

GPO Unions

The workforce at GPO is heavily unionized. There are twenty separate bargaining units represented by seventeen local unions, who are in turn affiliated with eight international unions. These unions, with the exception of the Machinists, participate in the Joint Council of Unions and all bargain with GPO under the Federal Labor Relations Act. In addition, the non-white collar unions have formed a Joint Bargaining Committee, through which they negotiate wages with the GPO under the Kiess Act.

A listing of the locals, their international affiliation and the approximate number of individuals represented in each bargaining unit is presented in Table IV. A listing of the percentage of individuals within bargaining units who have authorized automatic dues deductions by GPO is presented in Table V. In the case of several locals, it is recognized that members choose to pay dues through means other than by

payroll deductions. In general, these data reveal that the unions, with the exception of a few AFGE locals representing GS employees, are strongly unionized. The locals maintain a strong presence within all production and maintenance operations. The AFGE locals are presently attempting to gain wage bargaining under the Kiess Act.

Over the years, the unions have worked cooperatively with each other despite the uneven impact of changing technology and work force reduction. Unions have had to further adjust to management's assignment of work which has unevenly impacted upon various locals. Table VI provides a listing of the number of individuals in various bargaining units during this period of change. These data evidence that the impact of these changes has been anything but even.

During the same period (1975-1987), the overtime hours have also been reduced. While the work force has been reduced to 61% of the 1975 level, the overtime is only 43% of the 1975 level. This has resulted in a loss in take home pay. Table VII provides an enumeration of total hours, overtime, and number of employees for this period.

Recent Bargaining History

Bargaining at GPO during the last two decades has been complex and difficult. Complex in that GPO is a legislative agency but is managed by an executive branch appointment. The direction of change and labor relations within the agency is strongly influenced by management which is subject to the proclivities of different presidential administrations and individual Public Printers. Bargaining is made further complex by the dual laws (Kiess and FLRA) under which it is conducted and the rules and regulations governing employment in the federal sector. Bargaining is difficult in that there are twenty unions often with overlapping jurisdictions and occasional jealousies. Recently, management has contended that bargaining is further complicated by the attempt of unions to use influence upon the Congressional Joint Committee on Printing to gain favorable resolutions to bargaining disputes or widen the scope of bargaining.

Despite these complexities and difficulties, both sides are generally pleased with the bargaining outcomes. These outcomes have allowed GPO to adjust to a severe reduction in personnel, rapidly changing technology in printing composition, and significant court decisions in two EEO cases which have had a major impact upon hiring, training and promotions.

Wage negotiations under the first 46 years of the Kiess Act were generally conducted at yearly conferences. Outside union representatives were not present and discussions often extended into personnel policies, practices and working conditions, although settlements in these areas were not reduced to contracts. In 1970, the Columbia Typographical Union attempted to change a twenty five city wage comparison formula to a formula using the eleven largest U.S. cities. The new formula would yield a 57 cent an hour increase. The union appealed the Public Printer's 30 cent offer. The JCP voted to offer composing employees only 37 cents. After a period of slow downs, the union agreed to accept the 37 cents and the use of a 17 city formula in 1971. This formula was dispensed with in 1974 when the Public Printer offered the unions a 12 percent wage increase because of GPO's ability to pay and the rapid rise in the cost of living index. Rapid wage increases attributable to the cost of living occurred again in 1975. 1975 was also significant in that it covered a two year period and brought all contracts into a single anniversary date. This agreement was of further significance in that both parties accepted that if a wage formula ever resulted in a rate less than the Washington, D.C. area rate, the crafts would be paid no less than the Washington, D.C. area rate.

In 1977, a 25 city formula using the cities with the largest number of unionized graphic arts employees yielded a wage offer that in no case was less than 100 percent of each

craft's 1977 wage rate in private industry in Washington, D.C. The chairman of the JCP approved the offer but required that in the future both parties should allow ample time to resolve differences and complete negotiations at least thirty days prior to the anniversary date. This was done so that either side might have sufficient timely opportunity to appeal to the JCP. The JCP also amended its position on outside representatives thus formally recognizing the role of labor unions in the negotiations of wages for the first time in the history of the Kiess Act negotiations.

Prior to the 1978 negotiations, JCP did not allow the parties to make appeals on issues, such as the wage formula apart from an appeal on the actual wage offer. This changed when the unions requested to be able to consider in negotiations issues pertaining to job security, overtime, classification adjustments, and a common contract effecting all the unions on the committee. The JCP responded that although it had been "loath to involve itself in the day to day operations of the GPO, the JCP will treat the request from the Joint Bargaining Committee as a statutory appeal, permitting us to establish guidelines for subsequent negotiations without setting a precedent that would drag us into every dispute that may arise in the course of GPO negotiations." (16) JCP indicated that it wanted the parties to reach satisfactory agreements without having to have decisions imposed upon them.

The 1978 negotiations were significant in that it was agreed that GPO would make every effort to minimize layoffs and reductions-in-force as the result of the introduction of new processes and to give due regard to insuring full employment within the plant when contracting for printing with the commercial industry. The three non-craft production unions comprising about 2,000 workers were accorded, for the first time, coverage by the Kiess Act.

The 1979 negotiations reached impasse and the JCP for the first time delegated to a fact-finder the authority to issue a report of recommendations on a wage settlement. While JCP reserved the right to reject the fact-finders recommendations, it indicated that this would only happen if it clearly was "not in the interest of the governmert and just to the persons employed." (17) Fact finder Richard Block recommended that the wage settlement be in excess of President Carter's 5.5 pay cap which was proposed by the Public Printer. The JCP adopted the fact finders recommendation and a 6.8 percent increase was granted.

The negotiations the following year centered upon the impact of technological change upon the permanent and temporary employees. GPO was attempting to convert to the electronic photocomposing of the Congressional Record. This conversion resulted in the displacement of 66 printers who were hired on a full-time temporary basis which was not to exceed four

years. The forty-five day negotiations concluded on September 19, 1980 when the Acting Chairman of the JCP, Gus Hawkins, issued an understanding in which "all permanent employees will be protected." The letter to Public Printer Saylor concluded that,

> "I am very pleased that this agreement was reached and that permanent workforce will be complete protected. The Joint Committee stands behind this agreement and will do whatever is necessary to see it fully implemented." (18)

This statement has been regarded as providing job security to the permanent workforce. This directive was challenged by Public Printer Sawyer who instituted the then fashionable aggressive approach to labor relations. During his confirmation hearing, he expressed a desire to negotiate with GPO unions on all issues covered under the Kiess Act, that he would honor all previously negotiated agreements, and that he would abide by all decisions of the JCP. This orientation was however short lived in the early years of the Reagan administration. Sawyer argued that GPO was in poor financial health and this necessitated salary cutbacks and a reduced workforce. He claimed that he had the right under CSRA to furlough employees and that under this legislation this was a unilateral management right.

This position was strongly challenged by the unions before the JCP and during oversight hearings on the effect of the furloughs. During these hearings, questions were raised as to the the hiring of new high salaried executives, Mr. Sawyer's method of management, charges of sabotage by

workers and the apparent cozy relationship between GPO unions and the JCP. (19) Evidence disputing these assertions was provided including a brief history of JCP's participation in wage negotiations (20) and the appropriateness of the Kiess Act applying to any matter dealing with hours of work. A 1956 decision by Attorney General Brownell found that this was a mandatory subject for bargaining under the Kiess Act. (21) The furloughs were never implemented.

The 1982 negotiations again reached impasse and were referred by the JCP to fact finding conducted by Frederich Reel. During the hearing which was held in the latter part of July and beginning of August, over 150 exhibits were presented and testimony resulted in 2,140 pages of transcript. The GPO argued that its wage rates should be reduced by over 20 percent so as to be brought into conformity with the federal wage system.

The effect of the GPO proposal would have substituted the federal wage system rates for those arrived at by collective bargaining under the Kiess Act. The argument was rejected by Mr. Reel who stated, "the long and short of it is that GPO is not remotely comparable to any other federal printing facility." (22) He found that the Kiess Act was the appropriate legislation under which wage determination should be governed and that any change would require new legislation. He also found that in comparing wages to those

found in the private sector, (allowing for variations in work week hours and fringe benefits) "that GPO employees are neither significantly ahead nor do they lag behind their private sector counterparts; they are "in a generally equivalent position." (23) In this decision he found that he was in agreement with the decision of the previous fact finder.

The following year a GAO study initiated at the request of Representative Newt Gingrich came to an opposite conclusion. This study recommended that modifications in the pay system be considered which would either place GPO under the federal pay systems such as FWS and the General Schedule or be derived from private sector prevailing wage surveys. This conclusion and recommendation was strongly challenged by the Joint Council of GPO unions and the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Printing as being inconsistent with the two Fact Finders.

Labor Relations Today

Labor relations under the current Public Printer Ralph Kennickell have become less contentious. A second Master Agreement between GPO and the Joint Council of Unions has recently been concluded but awaits the final resolution of an issue dealing with work week. Management has argued that it needs to have flexibility in assigning when the work week is to begin. It contends that much of the overhead costs

could be reduced by assigning work on a Tuesday through Saturday basis. This proposal for a "sliding work week" is being strongly resisted by the Joint Council of Unions. They argue that the proposal is a proper subject for bargaining under the Kiess Act and not the CSRA. They have worked for more than a century on a Monday through Friday work week and that significant savings from overtime would not result from the sliding work week.

The AFGE locals representing non-production workers are attempting to gain inclusion under the Kiess Act. Following the JCP's 1978 decision to allow non-craft production workers to bargain wages under this Act, it was natural to expect that AFGE would eventually seek to be included. This proposal is not expected to be accepted by GPO and it is not clear how and when it might be resolved.

Several attempts to institute QWL programs which would extend labor-management cooperation beyond what had been agreed to in negotiations were unsuccessful. While these programs have met with mixed results in the private and public sector, they had very little chance of succeeding at GPO while management was pursuing anti-labor initiatives such as wage reductions, furlough, and contracting out. GPO has been unwilling to extend job security as a precondition to union participation. This is a fairly standard private sector guarantee and one that would seem reasonable given

the acrimony associated with labor relations during Sawyer's reign.

Several members of Management believe that they have been hampered by the interference of the Joint Committee on Printing. Despite the union evidence to the contrary (see Exhibit I) they persist in the belief that they are poorly served by the pro-labor predisposition of the Committee and its staff.

The unions do not share this view. They contend that there is very little ongoing communications with the committee or staff. They do acknowledge that the Kiess Act's recognition of the need for a dispute resolution procedure in lieu of the right to strike has resulted in appeals to the Committee. However, they do not see a pro-labor bias. They see, instead, management's aggravation with having to argue its case rather than the unilateral imposition of its will. The unions argue that the Printing Industry of America has gained great influence upon the appointment of the Public Printer and the policy of contracting out of work to the private sector. With this change has come management's hostility toward the Joint Committee. The unions feel that this is really misplacing the actual anti-labor sentiment of the Printing Industry of America.

GPO and the Future

The preceding analysis has established that the GPO's historical evolution has been a continuing adaptation to changes in the demand for its services and in the printing and information technology which it uses. The continual evolution has been successful in no small part because of the collective bargaining process. This process has enabled GPO and its workforce to achieve equitable adjustments to these changes. In recent years, the process has provided employees with stability and continuity despite a nearly 40% reduction in the workforce, a complete conversion from hot to cold typesetting two large EEO suits, and at times, a hostile top management.

Today, GPO is on the verge of yet another era of change, which will once again challenge its ability to adapt. It faces this latest evolutionary period with an able and willing workforce and a proven history of successfully embracing change.

GPO, because of its size, complexity and relatively unique organizational structure and function, has historically been slower to change than have many firms in the private sector printing and publishing industry. While this has been mischaracterized as an unwillingness or inability to change, it is a rather cost of government operation that does have residual benefits. One of the most significant benefits is

that the private sector firms in their zeal to out position their competition is more prone to proceed through trial and error. This provides those who survive with a short term competitive advantage over their competitors which includes GPO. However, it also provides GPO with many useful models upon which to evaluate its own course.

A recent compilation of the experience of newspapers in adapting to the latest technological revolution is an instructive case in point. This study, prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor in 1985, drew upon a sample of slightly over four hundred firms in the industry. One of the most convincing conclusions and one which is contrary to popular perception, was that for the most part, employees were not summarily dismissed because of technology induced declines in the demand for labor. In fact, barely one quarter of the firms in the sample actually laid off some of their workers. Attrition, retraining, and buyouts were, in that order, the more prevalent responses. The most prevalent single response was the reliance upon natural attrition. In most cases, however, newspaper firms searched for a combination or "portfolio" of responses that fit their particular circumstances. In larger firms where labor reductions were most prevalent, nearly 90 percent was achieved through buyouts, retraining or natural attrition. Table VIII summarizes the frequency of responses to technological changes by the newspapers included in the sample. (24)

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE:
TOTAL NEWSPAPER SAMPLE

	Total Sample		Union		Nonunion	
Response	Number of fimrs	Percent	Number of firms	Percent	Number of firms	Percent
Layoffs	114	27.6	59	32.4	55	23.8
Buyouts	119	28.9	82	45.1	37	16.1
Retaining	168	40.7	60	33.0	108	46.8
Attrition	255	60.3	143	78.6	112	46.5

NOTE: Percentage figures are based on reporting observations only; missing values are excluded.

The largest number of workers in the sample were voluntarily separated from their jobs through attrition. Nearly 30 percent of job losses were the result of buyouts, most of which were made by union firms. The average amount received per worker was about $13,200, but some workers reportedly received as much as $85,000 for their jobs. Table IX presents the impacts on displaced workers in the newspaper sample. (25)

IMPACTS ON DISPLACED WORKERS IN THE NEWSPAPER SAMPLE

	Number of Workers			Percent of Change		
Response	Total	Union	Nonunion	Total	Union	Nonunion
Layoffs	827	641	186	10.9	10.3	14.0
Buyouts	2195	2067	128	29.0	33.2	9.6
Retaining	551	288	263	7.3	4.6	19.8
Attrition	3983	3230	753	52.7	51.9	56.6
Total	7556	6226	1330	100.0	100.0	100.0

NOTE: Sample includes 172 union firms and 199 nonunion firms for which complete data were collected. These firms represent all but about 5 percent of workers affected.

While this study deals with a sample which is far less than a complete enumeration and is limited to the composing room, it provides strong evidence that popular opinion to the contrary, most firms in the private sector resort to t non-layoff response in the process of implementing new technology. In this respect, GPO has been similar to its private sector counterparts. The following presentation will provide some data to consider when reviewing the future impact of labor saving technologies.

Attrition

As one would imagine, the workforce at GPO is relatively older than in comparable printing and publishing firms. The average age for all GPO employees is 45.2 years. Over the recent period, relatively few new employees have been hired and retirements have been averaging more than 200 per year. This has helped to enable GPO to reduce its workforce by close to 40% in the last ten years. It also suggests that any future retrenchment could be managed in large part through attrition.

At present, 687 (13%) of the workforce is eligible to retire immediately. There are 843 workers who have been employed by GPO for more than twenty-five years and only 1,008 who have been there for ten years or less. Table X presents an analysis of years of service and retirement eligibility. Table XI presents a breakdown of employment by division.

TABLE X

YEARS OF SERVICE, AVERAGE AGE, & RETIREMENT ELIGIBILITY AT GPO

Years of Service	
0-5	496
6-10	412
11-15	935
16-20	1506
21-25	1048
26-30	591
31-35	186
36-40	46
41-45	17
46-50	3
Total	5240

Average Age GPO 45.2

Retirement Eligibility

55 and 30 years	164
60 and 20 years	276
62 and 5 years	247
Total	687

TABLE XI

TOTAL GPO EMPLOYMENT

Division #	Division	#Employees
0	Executive Office	692
1	Procurement	637
3	Operations	359
4	Production	313
5	Electronic Photocomposition	616
6	Press Division	701
7	Bindry	630
8	Regional Printing	244
9	Superintendent of Documents	930
	Total	5,122

The average age for production workers is higher than the GPO overall average. Many craft units have an average age approaching 50 years. They also have witnessed few new hires in the last ten years. The typos, for instance, have an average age of 52.7 years and 176 members presently eligible for retirement. Bindery workers have an average age of 52.3 years and one quarter are presently qualified for retirement.

The average age of non-production employees evidences a strong direct correlation with grade level. Lower grade levels average less than thirty years old, while the average age for the highest grade levels are in excess of fifty years.

Thus, attrition will continue to be a viable consideration for any dislocation associated with rapid technological change. However, attrition by itself creates consequences. Several production units are presently in a very precarious position as a result of past and potential retirements. Unit production could be seriously jeopardized if even a few of those eligible exercised their retirement rights. This appears to be a major area of concern even if major technological changes do not occur in the immediate future. Clearly attrition will only be a benefit if it occurs in conjunction with an overall management plan that has a concrete conception of the future. One assumes that such a management plan exists, but none of the elected union representatives have seen it. As a result, there is great apprehension over the nonarticulated future and individuals are unable to develop retirement plans to coincide with their own and GPO.

Retraining

A second alternative to layoffs is retraining. GPO has a proven record and considerable expertise in this area. More than ten unique training programs many lasting two year have been developed and successfully implemented. Retraining has resulted from the conversion to cold typesetting, class action discrimination, and the continuing shift from letterpress to offset printing. Additional training programs have enabled production workers to move into printing specialist positions. Individuals who complete these programs are assigned to procurement, production management, customer service, financial management, or quality control departments.

At present, complete records of the actual number of trainees both starting and completing the various programs are not available. However, there is sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that an increased future demand for retraining could be integrated into the existing structure. Course outlines, materials, and instructors are all in place. Previously offered programs have been refined and modified to the point where there is a general belief that the courses are beneficial both in terms of content and future job placement and performance.

There needs to be more effort made to evaluate and disseminate the GPO experience with training and retraining.

A very great effort has been made to achieve this success and if this is to remain an option to be relied upon in the face of future technological transformations, it needs to be given even greater attention.

Reassignment

If any of the GPO reorganization scenarios calling for decentralization would come to fruition, an important option instead of RIFs would certainly be reassignment to executive branch agencies. For those presently involved in the procurement and planning of printing the move would constitute little more than a lateral transfer. Agencies would immediately gain an expertise which they do not presently possess in sufficient numbers to satisfy the demands of this conversion. Individuals transferred would be red circled and any agency compensation not comparable with GPO's could be augmented from an endowment created out of the revolving fund.

Retraining displaced production workers, which has successfully been achieved in the past could be accelerated under this option and they too would be able to participate in a similar fashion. The eight hundred and fifty-nine individuals in top management, administration and human resources would in most cases already possess skills which would be analogues to those found in other agencies. A

similar compensation system could be employed and a placement service could be used to facilitate the process.

Buyouts

An option not presently used within the GPO is the early retirement-buyout. This was used briefly and selectively at least once in the past. It has been considered but not reemployed. This option has been extensively used in the private sector, particularly by large firms such as major newspapers. For individuals not able to retire nor be retrained and/or reassigned, a buyout option could be developed. This program could be selectively targeted or made generally available as the needs dictate.

All of the options presented in this section have real applications at GPO. Most of them are already in place and would require only refinement and expansion. Each component as well as the entire process would be provided a test for equity through collective negotiations with GPO unions. Unresolved disputes if they should arise would be subjected to appeals to the Joint Committee on Printing and perhaps fact finding.

Conclusion

The long and illustrious history of the Government Printing Office has prepared it well for the uncertain future. Now

in its second century of service to the Federal Government's need for printing and the American citizen's right to know, the GPO stands on the brink of yet another technological revolution. This revolution portends vast changes in its organization, method of production and even its mission and existence.

Despite the uncertainty surrounding its future, one conclusion predicated upon the past is assured. This concerns GPO's willingness and ability to adapt to change. Whether viewed from a technological, governmental operations or human relations perspective, this agency has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to embrace the challenge of transformation.

Technologically the GPO has evolved from hand to continuous process mechanized production. Hand compositors became Linotype operators. Sheet fed letterpresses became four color offset web pressmen. Finishing has evolved from a multiple step, hand operation to become a totally mechanized in line function. Hot typesetting was replaced by electronic composition. Color separation is now operated by lasers. Inventory, purchasing, cost accounting and document indexing and dissemination are all computer driven.

Government operations have expanded and with it has come an even increasing demand for printing. This has been satisfied by organizational and production changes that now

witness the vast majority of printing being produced for the executive branch and most of this is being contracted out. This was achieved with a relatively modest degree of dissatisfaction from government agencies and the public.

Human relations have also undergone a profound evolution. Throughout its long existence GPO has been a conscientious employer. As social values and employment practices have evolved, GPO has adjusted. Granted, not all the adjustments have been voluntary. However, the low quit rate, long term employment and upward mobility do attest to the conclusion that GPO is a superior employer. It's history of collective bargaining with the unique Kiess Act dating to 1924 and its present relationship with its twenty separate bargaining units further attests to GPO's ability to operate and evolve over time within the context of humane relationships.

The changes presently being given consideration in the Office of Technological Assessment's study bode a new challenge for GPO. The past has prepared it well. The vast number of individuals interviewed for this study conveyed a strong commitment to the organization and a high degree of satisfaction and dignity associated with their work. Within this environment great technological, operational and relational changes are possible.

GPO not only has the capacity to change, it also retains a powerful mechanism to effect the change, i.e., good faith

collective bargaining. Unionized workers, which have been a part of GPO from its inception, bring democratic decision making to the process. When the parameters of the anticipated changes are concretized, these unions and their elected leaders are ready and legally entitled to negotiate any and every impact upon the existing workforce. This bargaining will be most productive if union leaders are totally appraised of what is being considered and made full participants in all eventual decisions. Compliance obtained through democratic representative decision making has proven to be the most powerful mechanism of affirmative change.

The challenge posed by electronic printing is more vast than anything yet undertaken. It contains the potential of not just changing how printing is produced but also in transforming GPO and who does government printing. A challenge requiring change of this magnitude requires a collective good faith commitment and one which GPO appears able and at this point willing to provide.

TABLE 8

Department/Location AGENCY WIDE

Minority Statistics as of AS OF 9/87

PAY CATEGORY	TOTAL ALL EMPLOYEES		White (E)		Black (C)		Hispanic (D)		Oriental, Asian Islander (B)		American Indian (A)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Total All Pay Plans	3399	1777	1662	515	1638	1214	76	35	22	9	1	4
Total. General Schedule and Equivalent	1107	1270	693	439	361	789	35	29	17	9	1	4
GS-1	3	1			3	1						
GS-2	10	5	1	1	9	4						
GS-3	39	96	8	41	30	46	1	8		1		
GS-4	40	119	7	28	32	87	1	2		1		1
GS-5	119	314	35	95	74	214	8	5	2			
GS-6	43	228	16	54	24	168	2	6	1			
GS-7	65	175	22	57	40	112	1	2	2	2		2
GS-8	20	46	10	12	8	32	1	2	1			
GS-9	57	95	25	42	31	51	1	2				
GS-10	9	15	1	7	6	8	2					
GS-11	60	64	32	32	26	30	1	1	1	1		
GS-12	292	75	244	48	35	24	9		4	3		
GS-13	179	24	145	14	27	8	4	1	3	1		
GS-14	91	7	79	4	9	2	2		1			1
GS-15	45	2	39	1	4	1			2			
GS-16	20	1	17		1	1	1				1	
GS-17	7	2	5	2	1		1					
GS-18	8	1	7	1	1							
								—				

Department/Location [redacted]

Minority Statistics as of 9/87

TABLE

PAY CATEGORY	TOTAL ALL EMPLOYEES		White (E)		Black (C)		Hispanic (D)		Orientals Asian (B) Islander		American Indian (A)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
OTHER WAGE SYSTEMS	2292	507	969	76	1277	425	41	6	5			
Less than 10,000												
$10,000-11,999 ($4.81-5.76)												
$12,000-13,999 ($5.77-6.71)												
$14,000-15,999 ($6.74-7.69)	3		1		1		1					
$16,000-17,999 ($7.70-8.65)	10	4	2	1	7	2	1	1				
$18,000-19,999 ($8.66-9.61)	17	4	7	1	5	3	5					
$20,000-21,999 ($9.62-10.57)	113	75	8	6	100	68	4	1	1			
$22,000-23,999 ($10.55-11.53)	294	251	16	27	275	222	3	2				
$24,000-25,999 ($11.54-12.49)	338	51	24	5	312	45	2	1				
$26,000-27,999 ($12.50-13.46)	116	24	13	6	102	18	1					
$28,000-29,999 ($13.47-14.42)	45	2	6		37	2	2					
$30,000-31,999 ($14.43-15.38)	34	2	5		28	2	1					
$32,000-33,999 ($15.39-16.34)	8				5		3					
$34,000-35,999 ($16.35-17.30)	2	1	1		1	1						
$36,000 - 37,999	738	50	542	25	180	24	13	1	3			
$38,000-39,999	278	19	143	1	133	18	1		1			
$40,000-41,999	81	15	55	2	24	13	2					
$42,000-43,999	113	2	72	1	39	1	2					
$44,000 & over	102	7	74	1	28	6						

April 17, 1987

UNION LIST (20 BARGAINING UNITS)

	An Approximate amount of employees in each unit.
Washington Federal Printing Workers' Union (member of GCIU), Local 713-S (Printing Plant Workers)	1,020
Washington Government Photo Offset (member of GCIU), Local 538-C (Offset Platemaker Strippers)	69
Washington Printing and Graphic Communications Union (member of GCIU), Local No. 1-C (Two Units, Pressmen and Masonry Workers)	232
Graphic Communications International Union (GCIU), Local 285 (Offset Strippers)	138
Graphic Communications International Union (GCIU), Local 4-B (Two Units: Bookbinders (118) and Journeymen Bindery) (129)	247
Columbia Typographical Union No. 101 (two units, Composing Craft (552) and RRC (120)	672
Sheetmetal Workers' Int'l Union No. 100 (Sheet Metal Workers and Pipe Fitters)	21
International Association of Machinists, Local 2135 (Machinists)	36
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 2456 (Carpenters)	17
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), Local 121 (Electricians and Stationary Engineers)	65
Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, Local 1632 (Painters)	9
AFGE Local 1248 (Denver Field Printing Plant)	42 17
AFGE Local 3392 (Pueblo Public Distribution Center)	67 20
AFGE Local 1292 (Chicago Field Printing Plant)	27 6
AFGE Local 2618 (New York Field Printing Plant)	14 6
AFGE Local 2738 (Police)	62 4
AFGE Local 2738/Printing Crafts Joint Council (AFGE/PCJC) (Central Office White Collar Wkrs)	1,327 2
2816	* 4,065

* 78 Percent in units.

AFGE

APRIL 17, 1987

Appendix C
Table II

AFGE LOCAL #	LOCATION	# EMPLOYEES	DUES DEDUCTIONS MEMBERS	%
1248	Denver	42	17	40.5
3392	Pueblo	67	20	29.9
1292	Chicago	27	6	22.2
2618	New York	14	6	42.9
2738	Police	62	47 *	75.8
2876	Main GPO	1327	278	20.9
	Seattle	20	0	0
	Nurses	10-11	0	0

Appendix I
Table II

APRIL 17, 1987

UNION	# EMPLOYEES	DUES	%
Painters	9	8	89%
CTU (Printer/Proofreader)	552	318 * +	58%
Bookbinders	247	188	76%
GCIU (Strippers)	138	130 *	94%
Machinists	36	26	72%
IBEW (Electricians)	65	48	74%
Sheet Metal Workers	??	??	??
Carpenters	17	16	94%
PPW's	1020	764	75%
Platemakers/Strippers	69	59	86%
Pressmen	232	185 *	80%
RRC (CTU)	120	49	41%

+ -- Substantial number pay by cash

* -- Includes printing specialists no longer in the trade

Appendix A
TABLE I

Selected Occupation Classifications and Wage Increases

	Compositors	Cylinder Pressman	Offset Pressman	Bindry Workers	Printing Plant	General Grade	Regular Printers
1975	1864	187	184	316	1,991	2,896	350
%	10.63	10.57	10.47	10.47	10.60	5.00	10.00
1976	1821	167	173	293	1897	2898	347
%	8.47	8.57	8.44	9.39	8.47	5.00	8.00
1977	1810	150	184	271	1876	2873	339
%	5.17	6.07	5.89	5.77	5.15	7.00	5.80
1978	1682	130	173	248	1746	2753	309
%	5.57	5.53	5.56	5.60	5.55	5.50	5.50
1979	1528	92	123	234	1625	2644	293
%	6.77	6.78	6.80	6.84	6.76	7.00	7.00
1980	1421	89	206	217	1541	2629	254
%	6.01	6.01	5.97	6.01	6.00	9.10	6.20
1981	1169	58	214	187	1382	2646	115
%	11.41	18.53	11.41	11.34	11.37	4.80	4.80
1982	1124	48	248	167	1324	2446	115
%	5.09	5.12	5.12	5.09	5.06	4.00	?
1983	1044	52	255	165	1272	2400	115
%	1.66	1.67	1.67	1.69	1.62	4.00	?
1984	982	50	248	159	1272	2340	126
%	4.83	4.79	4.79	4.87	4.90	3.50	?
1985	898	42	238	145	1160	2371	123
%	4.54	4.57	4.57	4.55	4.57	000	3.45
1986	852	36	227	132	1078	2311	115
%	2.50	2.47	2.47	2.46	2.49	3.00	0.00
1987	802	37	222	117	1086	2381	109
%	3.02	2.98	2.98	3.04	3.00	?	?

Appendix F
TABLE VII

SPECIAL OVERTIME STATISTICS
TOTAL GPO

	Total Hours	Overtime Hours	Straight Hours	Employees (Sept. 30th)	Employees (Average)*
1975	18,533,349	1,161,902	17,371,447	8,512	8,352
1976	18,744,269	1,271,619	17,472,650	8,226	8,400
1977	17,706,191	987,050	16,719,141	7,914	8,038
1978	17,246,615	1,145,650	16,100,965	7,574	7,741
1979	16,334,455	929,195	15,405,260	7,226	7,406
1980	15,504,406	877,833	14,626,573	6,891	7,032
1981	14,417,907	782,439	13,635,468	6,473	6,556
1982	13,301,172	405,978	12,895,194	6,069	6,200
1983	12,731,171	463,181	12,267,990	5,815	5,898
1984	12,401,500	556,456	11,845,044	5,638	5,695
1985	12,053,743	560,855	11,492,888	5,457	5,525
1986	11,815,530	618,422	11,197,108	5,300	5,383
1987	11,516,135	688,004	10,828,131	5,176	5,206
1988					
1989					
1990					
1991					
1992					
1993					
1994					
1995					

* Straight hours divided by 2,080

Exhibits

Brief History of GPO Wage Negotiations/JCP Participation
1972-81

1972 - The Public Printer offered a 7 percent increase, based upon a 5.5 percent Federal Pay Board guideline, plus a 1.5 percent increase authorized pursuant to the President's wage-price stabilization program. The photo-engravers appealed to the Joint Committee claiming that the traditional formula for calculating wage rates (either a 17-city Bureau of Labor Statistics printing wage formula or the local private sector rate, whichever is higher) would have provided an 11 percent increase. The Joint Committee denied the appeal, granting the 7 percent increase recommended by the Public Printer.

1973 - The Public Printer offered an 8.5 percent increase when the 17 city formula from BLS would have provided an 11.7 percent increase and the local private sector scale would have provided a 14 percent increase. The Joint Committee ratified the 8.5 percent increase of the Public Printer.

1974 - The Public Printer again ignoring the traditional formula, offered a 12 percent increase which was accepted by the unions. Use of the traditional formula would have yielded increases of between 17-20 percent. The Joint Committee ratified the agreement.

1975* - The Public Printer offered a 10.5 percent increase. Local Washington wage settlement in the private sector was a 9 percent increase. The national average increase for 1975 in the private sector was 12.5 percent. Bureau of Printing and Engraving personnel received increases ranging from 10-16 percent. The Joint Committee ratified the 10.5 percent offer made by the Public Printer.

1976* - The Public Printer offered a 7.2 percent increase. Local Washington wage settlement in the private sector was a 9 percent increase. The Joint Committee ratified offer made by the Public Printer.

1977 - The Public Printer offered a 5.1 percent increase. There was a great deal of maneuvering with conflicting statistics about private sector/GPO wage scale comparisons. In the end the Joint Committee ratified the offer made of the Public Printer.

1978 - The Public Printer offered a 5.5 percent increase. Following an exchange of conflicting wage statistics and charges that the Public Printer had failed to bargain in good faith, an appeal was filed. The Joint Committee ratified the offer made by the Public Printer.

1979 - The Public Printer offered a 5.5 percent increase, the amount which was recommended by the President for all Federal employees. The unions sought 9 percent with cost of living escalator clause. The Joint Committee hired an arbitrator/fact-finder to assess both proposals. The fact-finder recommended a 6.8 percent increase which was concurred in by the JCP.

*Negotiated in June 1975.

1980-81 - The Joint Committee was prepared to employ an arbitrator/fact-finder to make recommendations if a bargaining impasse should rise. However, agreement was reached between the Public Printer and the unions without impasse. The agreement covered both 1980 and 1981, giving effective 7.02 percent and 6.2 percent increases respectively. The Joint Committee ratified the agreement.